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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Deputy Chief, Personnel Security Division

DATE: 23 June 1966

FROM : Acting Chief, Clearance Support Branch

SUBJECT: Future Computer Requirements

1. Reference is made to the memorandum of 20 June 1966, which requested "think pieces" in connection with computer requirements for the future.

✓ 2. It is my opinion that the entire security records system has been geared to "names" and that there is always a problem in recovering data when many facts on a situation are known, but the specific identity is not recalled. The same thing applies when we are attempting to determine names and other statistics on categories of problem cases. We often get the question as to what individuals are cleared at a particular institution, but there is no reliable, efficient, or expeditious way of handling the inquiry.

3. As one example of the problem, [redacted] a few months ago, conducted a survey on problem cases in which drinking was a significant factor or the employee was known to be an alcoholic. The only way to obtain this data was to cull the old problem reports and talk to those individuals who had been working on problem cases. The same difficulty is encountered when we are asked how many suicides there have been in the Agency.

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4. In December 1965, there was a report that a person who identified himself as an Agency employee, or an ex-Agency employee, had contacted an [redacted]


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[redacted] phonically contacted in order to confirm their presence in the United States. Again, the only method of developing a suspect list was in trying to remember the more significant and recent problem cases. All 701 cases and disgruntled ex-employees should be computerized.



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5. As yet another example of the problem, [] was recently interested in an applicant with a specific type of educational background, and a particular knowledge of a foreign area. The only method of exploring the lead was to have a number of employees review several hundred files. The question can be raised as to how many Agency employees have travelled to the USSR. How many have served in Iron Curtain posts? How many have been recruited at a particular college, possibly from a particular Personnel Lead Source?

6. There have also been the cases of mysterious phone calls to the Night Security Office, or to Senior Agency officials. This is in addition to obscene phone calls to Agency female employees. It would appear to me that the computer system should be geared to record significant information on these "Unknown Subjects".

7. At various times there has been a keen interest in leaks to the news media, and a task force was created prior to the publication of "The Invisible Government". It would appear to be that as one phase of such inquiries there should be a quick, efficient means of determining those employees who have had press contacts. This, of course, would tie in with the names of disgruntled employees, close associates of prime suspects, degree of access, etc.

8. Some years ago, there was some general thought of preparing a "damage assessment" on all individuals who were leaving the Agency. Although the idea was not considered feasible at that time, I feel that with the development of computer methods, and the use of the codeword system of clearances, something might be done in the direction of preparing such assessments or studies on all employees. One of these days, there might be a defection. I don't believe the security, medical, or personnel files give any clear idea as to the sensitivity of information to which one has been exposed.

9. In the industrial security area, there is a current interest in a company because of Fraud Against the Government investigation by the FBI. This is a relatively small company, but a preliminary check indicates that we have processed about fifteen (15) clearances while there is a single contract for \$39,000. In retrospect, there have been various "indicators" of a conflict of interest, but there has been no real control by the Office of Logistics or the Office of Security.

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10. On the topic of corporations, foundations, and educational institutes, the question is often raised as to who is cleared, and what is the level of their clearances. I can think of one organization which has individuals who hold every conceivable type of clearance - covert and overt, sensitive and non-sensitive. In other cases, there

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11. In summary, there would appear to be benefit to recording categories of significant data which, from a CI standpoint, will lead us back to prime suspects.

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